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Abstract 
This paper analyzes pension reforms in Europe and their determinants. We introduce an al-
ternative measure of pension reforms by comparing long-term forecasts of pension expend-
itures for seventeen European countries. The larger the decrease in expected spending on 
public pensions in 2050 between two base years, the more successful an pension reform 
the country achieved (after controlling for other factors, such as demography). Our anal-
ysis shows that the reform effort varies widely across countries and over time. In the sec-
ond part of the paper, we analyze factors that may facilitate or hamper pension. Only 
the measure of trade union power proves to be significant in explaining pension reforms. 
However, specific pension system factors are significant and suggest that European gov-
ernments do reform their pension systems when faced with the threat of escalating pen-
sion expenditures. 
1. Introduction 
Public pension systems represent the largest expenditure item in almost all 
developed countries. Countries of the European Union spend on average 10.6% of 
their GDP on public pensions. Indeed, Austria, Poland, and Italy spend as much as 
13–14% of their GDPs on public pension schemes. Moreover, pension expenditures 
are expected to grow fast, as European nations are aging quickly. The European Un-
ion estimates that Portugal may spend 20% of its GDP in 2050 only on pensions. 
Several countries (Hungary, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Spain) do not lag far behind. 
Pension systems thus represent an threat to public finance stability and their financ-
ing may undermine economic growth and competitiveness across the continent.  
The European governments are not ignorant of these trends. Indeed, they reg-
ularly introduce “pension reforms.” These reforms diverge widely in their con-
sistency and efficiency. In many countries, reforms have been enacted only to be 
scrapped or substantially revised after an few years. Indeed, the very term “pension 
reform” has been compromised, as no clear definition is available and widely ac-
cepted.  
This paper seeks to categorize pension reforms in the European Union using 
the alternative measure of an pension reform index. We concentrate on the long-term 
effects of pension reforms as captured by long-term projections of pension system 
expenditures. A pension reform is deemed to be successful if it lowers future expend-
itures. The  larger the  decrease in expected spending on public pensions in 2050, 
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the more successful an pension reform is. As we show, only four countries in the EU 
managed to reduce their expected spending on pensions in both reference periods.  
We also analyze which factors influence pension reforms. As pension reforms 
have very long-term effects, their determinants are mostly institutional and political. 
Our econometric analysis shows that an pension reform’s success depends inversely 
on the power of trade unions and on current pension spending, and positively on 
the expected increase in expenditures. Other factors, such as quality of fiscal insti-
tutions, size of the existing funded pillar, public debt or demographic developments, 
do not seem to play an significant role. Moreover, we show that governments are not 
concerned about the  level of pension spending, but do care about its projected 
change.  
The paper is organized as follows. First, we look at the European pension 
systems and analyze the main ingredients of the European reforms. The second sec-
tion then provides an  more detailed analysis of the  existing pension systems in 
the new member states of the European Union (EU-10) and the reforms they have 
implemented so far. The third section provides an analysis of political and institu-
tional factors underpinning pension reforms, namely, the interplay between the in-
stitutional structure and key decision-making bodies. Following the papers by James 
and Brooks (2001) and Schludi (2001), we discuss the role of fiscal institutions, pub-
lic debt, trade union clout and other factors and their conduciveness to pension re-
forms. 
In the fourth section we present the data used and discuss an political econo-
my model of pension reforms in which we study the impact of political, demograph-
ic, and institutional factors on fiscal reforms carried out since 1995 in the  Euro- 
pean Union. The following section discusses the statistical results of our model and 
provides an economic interpretation of them. The last section then summarizes our 
paper and proposes some tentative policy recommendations.  
2. Pension Systems in Europe and Their Main Characteristics 
Pension systems in most European countries are based on the mandatory, quasi- 
-fiscal pay-as-you-go principle. That makes them exposed to the demographic risk of 
rapidly aging populations. Pension expenditures will rise unless countries take de-
termined action to limit them. This can be done either by changing the pension 
systems’ “parameters”, or by undertaking an “radical reform” that changes the fun-
damental principles of the  system. In the  former case, governments can increase 
the (effective) retirement age or lower real pension benefits, or they can combine 
the  two approaches. In an  radical reform, the  pay-as-you-go system may be (par-
tially) substituted by an  system based on accumulation of private savings. While 
the first approach is politically more feasible and provides less uncertainty, the latter 
reform may achieve – after an fairly long transition process – more sustainable re-
sults.  
European countries have adopted an plethora of pension reform attempts, some 
more successful than others. In order to facilitate European reforms, the EU has 
established an so-called “open method of coordination”, whereby the member states 
share experiences from their pension reforms and possibly increase the peer pressure 
on reluctant reformers. Also, as Holzmann, MacKellar, and Rutkowski (2003) argue, 294                                      Finance a úvČr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4 
 
the  method of open coordination was originally formulated to prevent discussion 
about an single pan-European pension reform, which would weaken the national 
authorities. The first Joint Report on adequate and sustainable pensions was pub-
lished in 2002. This report did not cover the former Communist countries that joined 
the European Union on May 1, 2004. More inclusive Joint Reports have been pub-
lished since 2005.  
The main results, replicated in Tables 1–2, indicate that European pension 
systems differ substantially. While Italy and Poland spend 14% of their GDPs on 
public pensions, several countries make do with 6–7% of their GDP (see Table 1). 
The standard retirement age is typically set at 65, but most Europeans retire earlier: 
an average French male worker retires at 58 and an Slovak female worker at 55 years 
of age. At the other extreme, Portuguese workers of both sexes work until 66 and 
Spanish women retire on average two years later than Spanish men (see Table 1). 
Table 2 summarizes the generosity of pension systems in European coun-
tries as measured by the replacement ratio. The ratio diverges widely: from more 
than 100% of the previous wage for most Luxembourgers, to some 30% of pre-
vious income for above-average earners in several countries, including the Czech 
Republic.  
Table 2 also shows the revenue side of European pension systems. The con-
tribution rates are levied on differently defined income, but in all countries the rates 
Table 1  Gross Public Pension Expenditures as a Share of GDP and Effective 
Retirement Age, Selected EU Countries 
Public pension expenditures 
as % of GDP 
Change  Effective retirement age 
2004  2050  2004–2050  Men  Women 
Austria  13.4  12.2  -1.2  59.1  58.1 
Belgium  10.4  15.5  5.1  59.3  58.4 
Czech Republic  8.5  14.0  5.6  61.5  58.4 
Denmark  9.5  12.8  3.3  64.1  61.4 
Estonia  6.7  4.2  -2.5  na  na 
Finland  10.7  13.7  3.1  60.5  60.1 
France  12.8  14.8  2.0  58.5  59.2 
Germany  11.4  13.1  1.7  61.7  60.7 
Hungary  10.4  17.1  6.7  58.9  57.3 
Ireland  4.7  11.1  6.4  65.2  64.7 
Italy  14.2  14.7  0.4  60.4  60.9 
Latvia  6.8  5.6  -1.2  na  na 
Lithuania  6.7  8.6  1.8  na  na 
Luxembourg  10.0  17.4  7.4  59.2  61.3 
Netherlands  7.7  11.2  3.5  60.2  60.5 
Poland  13.9  8.0  -5.9  61.3  58.0 
Portugal  11.1  20.8  9.7  66.2  65.9 
Slovakia  7.2  9.0  1.8  59.2  55.5 
Spain  8.6  15.7  7.1  61.1  63.4 
Sweden  10.6  11.2  0.6  65.5  62.5 
United Kingdom  6.6  8.6  2.0  63.2  61.4 
EU-25 average  10.6  12.8  2.2 na  na 
Source: Economic Policy Committee (2006): Age-related public expenditure projections for the EU-25 Member 
States up to 2050, European Economy, Special Reports. Finance a úvČr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4                                           295 
 
are between 20% and 40% of eligible income and are often topped up by general tax 
revenues (only Denmark finances its entire system from general taxation).  
The European pension systems thus vary widely in all aspects. There have been 
attempts to categorize them into several groups – Bismarckian systems with high con-
tribution rates in most of continental Europe, the  Scandinavian model with an  high 
retirement age and generous replacement rates, Anglo-Saxon “Beveridge” models with 
low benefits, and finally, the southern model with relatively generous benefits. How-
ever, our paper is more concerned with pension reforms per se, so we abstain from 
these qualifications. 
3. Pension Reforms in the EU-10 
In this section we briefly present the main characteristics of the pension re-
forms undertaken in the ten Central and Eastern European countries that became EU 
















coverage  Tax financing 
Austria     93.2%    22.8%    2.6% of GDP 
Belgium  63.1%      37.94%  1/3 of total soc. sec. 
financing 
Czech Republic  58.2%    28.0%     
Estonia  60.9%    22.0%    6% of soc.sec. pensions 
Denmark  54.1%        Fully financed by taxes 
Finland  71.5%    23.9–28.2%    1.7% of GDP 
France  68.8%  16.35%      Means-tested minimum 
pensions 
Germany  71.8%    19.5%    27.5% of total pension 
expenditure 
Greece  99.9%    20.0%    1% of GDP 
Hungary  90.5%  26.5%      2.4% of GDP 
Ireland  36.6%      12.5–14.75% Non-contributory benefits 
by taxes 
Italy  88.8%    32.7%    Social assistance pensions 
by taxes 
Latvia  81.8%  20.0%      6.2% of GDP 
Lithuania  71.3%    26.0%    Special pensions by 
general taxes 
Luxembourg  109.8%    24.0%    1/3 of contrib. from taxes + 
2.5% 
Netherlands  84.1%    26.2–33%     
Poland  69.7%    32.52%    3.8% of GDP 
Portugal  79.8%      34.75%  Means-tested minimum 
pensions 
Slovakia  60.2%    24.0%     
Spain  88.3%      28.3%  Means-tested minimum 
pensions 
Sweden  68.2%  20.2%      Means-tested disability and 
survivors pensions 
United Kingdom  47.6%      19.85%  Means-tested pension 
credits 
Source: European Commission (2007) and OECD (2005). 296                                      Finance a úvČr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4 
members in 2004 and 2007 (the EU-10).
1 A detailed discussion of these countries’ 
pension systems and their reforms is given in Appendix 1.  
Central European countries
2 inherited pension systems firmly rooted in their 
Communist past. The main roles of pension systems were to prevent poverty, in-
crease dependence on the  government and to manipulate the  labor force. These 
political objectives yielded pension systems with an low retirement age, little varia-
tion in pension benefits, and no private pension savings. Such systems hindered these 
countries’ convergence toward richer European countries and due to fast aging, most 
pension systems in Central Europe dived into deficits in the mid-1990s, increasing 
the pressure on governments grappling with worsening fiscal balances.  
In the mid-1990s, most Central European countries modernized their pension 
systems, separated them from the central government budget, increased the retire-
ment age and made pension benefits more dependent on pension contributions. 
The Czech Republic implemented such an reform in 1994, complemented by the cre-
ation of voluntary private pension funds. The Czech Republic was actually an front-
runner when it launched (voluntary) private pension funds in 1994 and reformed its 
pension system in 1996 (the retirement age was increased and pensions were linked 
to lifetime labor income).  
However, these “first-wave” pension reforms proved to be insufficient very 
quickly, as Central European societies faced the phenomena of aging, whereby mor-
tality dropped due to better health care and improved eating (and drinking) habits. At 
the same time, fertility rates collapsed as women faced both greater opportunities in 
labor markets and greater uncertainty. The fertility rate fell as low as 1.17 children 
born per woman in some Central European countries and old-age pension expendi-
tures are expected to rise rapidly in all countries in the region. 
In the late 1990s, Poland and Latvia followed the Swedish example and re-
formed their pension systems to “notionally defined contributions” (NDC) systems, 
where contributions are spent as in an classical pay-as-you-go system, but contri-
butors are credited with an notional account where their contributions are indexed by 
an government-set rule. As Disney (1999) shows, significant differences in indexa-
tion and revaluation procedures, transition strategies, and accumulation of special 
credits unrelated to contributions to notional accounts make NDC systems less 
transparent.  
Several Central European countries implemented “radical” pension reforms 
inspired by reforms in Latin America, particularly in Chile and further boosted by 
an influential 1994 World Bank report on pension reform. That study lent support to 
an “multi-pillar” model of pension reform combining an public redistributive pension 
scheme with an private funded pension scheme based on individual accounts. There-
fore, structural pension reforms, i.e., reforms introducing private pension savings, 
were embraced in several countries. Hungary adopted such an “three-pillar” pension 
1 We will refer to this group of countries – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia – as the EU-10.  
2 Most countries in the region have implemented either “parametric” or “radical” reforms. The parametric 
reforms are more difficult to define – most countries change their systems almost continuously (Dusek and
Kopecsni, 2008). In this paper, we describe reforms that were implemented in the EU-10 countries. For 
an comprehensive overview of Western European pension reforms, see Immergut et al. (2007). Finance a úvČr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4                                           297 
 
system in 1998. Poland followed suit (with an even more comprehensive reform) in 
1999 and Estonia and Latvia then implemented reforms in 2001 and 2002, respec-
tively. Croatia and Bulgaria also reformed their pension systems in 2002. The most 
recent reforms were adopted in Ukraine (2003), Lithuania (2004), and Slovakia (2005). 
Hungary reformed its system yet again in 2006 – see Table 3. In total, seven of 
the EU-10 have implemented pension reforms based on partial privatization.
3 Thus 
the region has become the second hotbed of the  so-called “structural” pension re-
forms (Latin America being the first). Nevertheless, as the pension system operates 
in the very long term, the effects of these changes are not apparent yet.  
3.1 Pension Challenges 
As our discussion illustrates, Central European countries have chosen various 
different approaches to pension reform. The vigorous reformers – namely Poland, 
Estonia and since 2005 Slovakia – have witnessed much more benign developments 
in their current pension spending and more importantly, they may avoid the stark 
increases in pension expenditures projected for more apathetic countries such as 
the Czech Republic or Slovenia. For example, public pension expenditures are set to 
remain stable in Estonia at about 7% of GDP. Expenditures will fall in Poland from 
14% of GDP in 2004 to some 9% in 2050. On the other hand, pension expenditures 
will rise to 17% of GDP in Slovenia and to 15% in the Czech Republic. Hungary de-
monstrates that an imperfect pension reform coupled with government inconsistency 
and political maneuvering may even exacerbate the  long-term outlook (the most 
recent reform of 2006 has not been incorporated into the projections yet). 
However, pension systems do not only interact with public budgets. Their im-
pact is felt throughout the economy, most profoundly in labor and capital markets. 
Table 2 shows the  total contributions to the  pension systems in various countries. 
Beyond any doubt, contribution rates of around 30% of the wage bill render the labor 
less competitive in these countries and increase unemployment. The countries that 
Table 3  Pension Reforms in CEE Countries
Country  Reform started 
Total pension 
contribution  
(% of wages) 
Contribution to 
funded pillar  
(% of wages) 
Pension fund 
assets (% of 
GDP in 2007) 
Bulgaria  2002  27  5  5 
Czech Republic    28 (21.5+6.5)  0  5.1 
Estonia  2002  22 (20+2)  6 (4+2)  5.0 
Hungary  1998, 2006  26.5 (18+8.5)  8  11.2 
Latvia 
2001, FF increasing 
until 2010 
25.51 (only 20 in-
cluded in calculation 
of NDC) 
2–10 (2006–
2010)  3.0 
Lithuania  2004  26 (23.5+2.5)  5.5  1.5 (2006) 
Romania  2008  27.5  2–6 (2008–2016) 0 
Poland  1999  32.52  7.3  12.4 
Slovenia    24.35 (8.85+15.5)  0  2.7 (2006) 
Slovakia  2005  24 (17+7)  9  4.2 
Source: OECD Global Pension Statistics, European Commission (2006), national ministries. 
3 Three other post-Communist countries – Croatia, Kazakhstan, and Russia – have implemented similar 
reforms, but they are not EU members. 298                                      Finance a úvČr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4 
have implemented pension reforms have channeled part of this burden to private 
savings, i.e., they have eliminated part of the deadweight loss associated with the ap-
parent tax nature of pension contributions. Also, pension reformers tend to have 
an larger stock of assets accumulated in pension funds, although the depth of assets is 
still minuscule. This building up of savings makes domestic capital markets more 
efficient and may help countries to limit the current account deficits associated with 
large capital inflows.  
Looking at the EU as an whole, Estonia, Latvia, Sweden, and the UK seem to 
be best prepared for the aging process, as their spending on pensions is limited. Ire-
land belongs to this category as well, despite its high forecasted increase in spending. 
Another group of countries – Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Lithuania, the Nether-
lands, Austria, Slovakia, and Finland – have introduced reforms that stabilize their 
pension expenditures, albeit at an relatively high level. The most pressing problems 
face the Czech Republic, Greece, Spain, Hungary, Portugal, and Slovenia.
4  
4. Political Economy of Pension Reforms 
Pension reforms have been highly controversial all across the world. Only in 
the 1990s, as Chile’s pension reform began to be seen as an success, did governments 
start to consider pension reforms based on partial or full privatization. Two regions 
stood out as hotbeds of pension reform. Chile inspired many of its Latin American 
neighbors to implement variations of its reform. The second region to embrace struc-
tural pension reforms enthusiastically was Central and Eastern Europe, where gov-
ernments were struggling with an heritage of socialist egalitarian pension systems 
with universal coverage, low retirement ages, and disastrous impact on labor markets.  
Wherever introduced, pension reforms were met with great political oppo-
sition. Different (and often large and influential) interest groups defended the exist-
ing public pension and often succeeded in creating an  broad coalition of public 
support for preserving the status quo policy design (see Pierson, 1996). Since pension 
reform imposes direct costs on beneficiaries of the status quo while offering only 
distant benefits to an broader constituency of citizens (such as an more financially 
sustainable pension system), this reform is rarely desired by the median voter (Kit-
schelt, 2001) and is sometimes labeled an “politically infeasible” policy (Pierson and 
Weaver, 1993; Pierson, 1994).  
Some authors (see Muller, 1999) stress that the diffusion of market-oriented 
pension reforms in Central Europe was promoted by the  World Bank. However, 
other authors show that the  WB was used as an  “scapegoat” by reform-minded 
governments (Rocha et al., 2001). A more important factor seems to have been inter-
nal divisions within governments. Most often, as in Poland and Hungary, the finance 
ministry supported market-oriented pension reforms with an high share of capital- 
-funded provision for old age, while the ministries of labor and social affairs advo-
cated an parametric reform. A similar split is evident between economists (typically 
for the market-oriented approach) and sociologists and lawyers (typically for gradual 
reform) in many countries. In some other countries, such as the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia until 1998, the finance ministry did not support radical pension reform, as 
4 Malta and Luxemburg also face major increases in their pension spending, but they are not discussed in
this paper. For an discussion, see European Commission (2006a) and its Technical Annex.  Finance a úvČr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4                                           299 
high contribution rates and almost universal coverage allowed pension systems to 
generate surpluses. Indeed, the Czech Finance Ministry shied away from supporting 
an (modest) reform proposal of the Labor Ministry in 1997.  
Another key parameter of pension reforms in Central Europe was the position 
of trade unions. Trade unions are often the leading player within the pension reform 
opposition and depending on their role and power in the country, they often blocked 
reforms even though their members would probably have benefited from them – see 
the discussion of the Czech Republic’s and Slovenia’s reform attempts in Appendix 1. 
Trade unions seem to be willing to accept changes to the system only when they are 
convinced that without the changes, the pension system may collapse. The Polish and 
Czech experience illustrates this approach squarely. 
In the early 1990s, the Polish trade union movement Solidarity was an influ-
ential actor fighting for the  improvement of pensioners’ income by advocating 
indexation and valorization. Only when the  trade unions were transformed into 
an political party and became an part of government did their role change and in 
the late 1990s they supported privatization pension reforms in Poland. In contrast, 
the  Czech trade unions have opposed any change to the  pension system. Indeed, 
the first comprehensive strike after the collapse of Communism was organized by 
the trade unions in 1995 to protest against the raising of the official retirement age. 
Even though the strike was unsuccessful, it ushered in an highly political approach to 
pension reform that has dominated the Czech scene ever since.  
“Benefit of crises” is another hypothesis, among others proposed by Drazen 
and Grilli (1993). A preceding crisis, for example rising deficits in the pension sys-
tem or late payments of benefits, may increase the  population’s acceptance of 
reforms. A crisis also weakens the opponents of reform and increases the power of 
pro-reform actors, who often, but not always, include the Ministry of Finance or 
the financial industry. 
One may speculate that governments tend to reform those pension systems 
which create the risk of destabilizing public finances the most. If an pension system 
has an large implicit debt, i.e., the net present liabilities of the system toward either 
the working or the living, or even all future generations, the government should have 
incentives to rein in the system to make it less of an risk to the future fiscal balance. 
However, an high implicit debt makes pension reform less likely, as the government 
may be scared by the size of the debt, which is, at least partially, made explicit during 
the reform.
5  
Other set of institutions that might have influenced the pension reforms in 
Central Europe is their election systems. As Persson (2003) claims, two election sys-
tems have distinctive effects on social security systems (and their reforms). In an di-
rect election system with single-member districts, successful candidates concentrate 
on the tangible effects on their geographically defined constituencies, where old-age 
voters are in the minority. Once in power, an directly elected government is more 
exposed to criticism and finds it harder to “avoid blame” by sharing the political 
costs of an reform with coalition partners or to make changes in the pension system 
less understandable by complex formulae or long transition periods (see Weaver, 
5 That has been the argument of the Czech Labor Ministry – one cannot help seeing the irony in the ar-
gument: the worse (financially) the system is designated, the more expensive its reform is. 300                                      Finance a úvČr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4 
1986). On the other hand, an proportional election system favors wide-agenda po-
litical parties. Social security and pensions represent an  very attractive policy in 
the proportional system; as such an policy targets the well-defined and single-issue- 
-concentrated voter group of pensioners. In the transition context this effect is even 
stronger, as there are no private pensions, so all pensioners as well as people close to 
retirement depend exclusively on public pensions and thus on politicians.  
However, in Central Europe the empirics are very inconclusive in this respect. 
Some countries with strong aspects of the proportional electoral system (the Baltic 
countries, Hungary) have implemented reforms, while some other “proportionalists” 
(Slovenia and the Czech Republic) have remained very cautious and have not re-
formed their systems. Appendix  1 contains an  detailed discussion of the  main 
features of the pension systems in the ten Central and Eastern European countries 
that joined the EU in 2004 and in 2007. We describe the systems’ parameters and 
then turn to the political aspects of the reforms and the future challenges that these 
pension sys-tems face.  
What seems least controversial, though, is the fact that the longer countries 
wait to initiate necessary pension reforms, the more difficult those reforms will be to 
implement. Pension reforms require the support of an majority of voters, and reforms 
that aim at reducing the size of unfunded pension systems are likely to be opposed by 
the rapidly aging societies in Central Europe. 
5. Model Specification and Data 
Our model uses the data from the 17 European countries that are both EU and 
OECD members, so that consistent data are available.
6 Thus the set of data does not 
include the three Baltic countries (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) and Slovenia. 
While this is clearly an loss, the data available simply do not allow these four to be 
included. The 17 countries analyzed here have adopted an wide array of pension re-
forms, from expansion of the scheme in Portugal to partial privatization in Poland, so 
the  sample captures the  main pension trends in Europe. The  data were assembled 
from various sources. Most come from the EU’s Special Report: European Economy 
No. 1/2006, which analyzed the impact of aging on public expenditures (European 
Commission, 2006b), from an European Commission staff working document which 
is providing detailed data on 25 EU member countries (European Commission, 2006a) 
and from the  country reports of the  Observatoire Social Européen, but national 
sources were used as well. Earlier data were assembled using OECD datasets and 
papers from the mid-1990s, for example Roseveare et al. (1996). 
5.1 Dependent Variable: Pension Reform Index
The dependent variable of our model is constructed as to allow analysis of all 
EU countries, even though strictly speaking they might not have implemented an “re-
form” as defined in the previous literature. We measure the pension reform index (PRI) 
by comparing expenditure on public pension schemes in 2050 as expected in 1995, 
1999 and 2005. Thus, pension reform in 1995–1999 is summarized by the change 
6 Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, France, Hungary, Spain, Ireland, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Greece had to be eliminated 
for an lack of data. Finance a úvČr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4                                           301 
 
in expectations of pension expenditures in 2050 between these two years. If ex-
pectations were lower in 1999 than in 1995, the pension reform resulted in an re-
duction of pension expenditures. 
This measure has some weaknesses, of course. The change in expectations 
may have been driven by factors other than pension reforms (productivity assump-
tions, demographic projections). We try to control for demographic assumptions by 
including an demographic variable in our regression (see below). Other factors are 
more complex, but we believe that our measure of pension reform efforts still cap-
tures governments’ efforts as well. Note that it provides an more detailed (and con-
tinuous) dataset than most binary reform indices. Furthermore, our definition of 
an pension reform is much more inclusive than those in the previous literature. We 
do not examine the nature or structure of the reform, whereas, for example, James 
and Brooks in Holzmann and Siglitz (2001) include only “pension privatization” in 
their definition. In such an setting, high pension expenditure makes pension priva-
tization less likely, but this is not necessarily the case in our model. 
As Table 4 reveals, the most vigorous reformers in 1995–1999 were Poland and 
Italy, which both managed to cut their expected pension expenditures in 2050 by 
more than 6% of GDP. On the other hand, Ireland witnessed its expectations rise by 
6% of GDP. 
The same method is then applied to the period 1999–2005: the country that 
cut its expected pension outlays most in this period was Austria, where expectations 
of pension expenditure in 2050 fell from 17% of GDP to 12.2% of GDP. In the same 
period, expectations in Portugal rocketed by 7.6% of GDP! 
Table 4 illustrates the pension reform index in the two periods. While Italy 
and Poland remain the two largest reformers overall, Finland, Spain, and Germany 
emerge as consistent reformers who cut, albeit modestly, their expected expenditures 
Table 4  Pension Reform Index
Expenditures as % of GDP in 2050  
expected in  Pension reform index 
  1995  1999  2005  1999/1995  2005/1999 
Belgium  15.1  13.3  15.5  1.8  -2.2 
Czech Republic  12.0  14.6  14.0  -2.6  0.6 
Denmark  11.5  13.3  12.8  -1.8  0.5 
Germany  17.5  16.9  13.1  0.6  3.8 
Greece  24.0  24.8  24.8  -0.8  0.0 
Spain  19.1  17.3  15.7  1.8  1.6 
France  14.4  15.8  14.8  -1.4  -1.0 
Ireland  3.0  9.0  11.1  -6.0  -2.1 
Italy  20.3  14.1  14.7  6.2  -0.6 
Hungary  15.0  17.0  17.1  -2.0  -0.1 
Netherlands  11.4  13.6  11.2  -2.2  2.4 
Austria  14.9  17.0  12.2  -2.1  4.8 
Poland  15.0  8.3  8.0  6.7  0.3 
Portugal  16.5  13.2  20.8  3.3  -7.6 
Slovakia  11.0  12.0  9.0  -1.0  3.0 
Finland  17.7  15.9  13.7  1.8  2.2 
Sweden  14.5  10.7  11.2  3.8  -0.5 
UK  4.1  4.4  8.6  -0.3  4.2 
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for 2050 in both periods (their PRIs are positive in both periods). Other countries 
(Belgium, Austria, the  Netherlands, and Portugal) zigzagged between the  two pe-
riods, cutting in one and expanding in the other. Pension expenditure expectations 
grew in both periods in Ireland, the UK, and Hungary. 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the PRI and pension expenditures. 
We observe an complex pattern where pension reform (a positive PRI) is pursued in 
countries with both high and low expenditures and where pension escalation (a nega-
tive PRI) occurs in both the cheap Irish and the expensive Portuguese systems. 
5.2 Independent Variables 
The independent variables used in the model reflect the political economy the-
ory discussed in the previous section. We include variables on trade union power, 
public debt, quality of fiscal institutions, pension expenditures, and demographic 
projections. Some other obvious candidates (implicit pension debt) could not be in-
cluded due to an lack of data. 
Trade union power. As discussed above, trade unions are often the principal 
opponent of reform. Thus, their position and power within the country may influence 
the pension reform outcome. Two measures of trade union power are used. The first 
is the trade union density (TUD). The higher the share of the labor force that belongs 
to an union, the bigger clout the unions have. Data on trade union density are avail-
able and vary from 10% in France to 75% in Denmark. As these two numbers already 
indicate, the density probably reflects the real position of trade unions poorly. That’s 
why we include another variable, collective bargaining coverage (CBC), which may 
signal the unions’ power better. In many EU countries, trade unions negotiate wages 
for 90% of the labor force, even though their membership is much lower. In Austria, 
98% of contracts are covered by trade union bargaining. The Czech Republic repre-
sents the other extreme, with only 27% of contracts following trade union bargaining.  
Fiscal institutions (FI). The literature on fiscal institutions and its impact on 
budgetary outcomes is burgeoning. A correct institutional set-up is believed to coun-
teract the deficit bias of politicians – see Schuknecht (2004) or Schneider et al. (2007) 
for an discussion. Proper fiscal institutions should prevent governments from amass-
ing large pension debts and should facilitate restrictive reforms. Buti, Mongay and 
von Hagen (2002) discuss fiscal institutions in the “old” EU member countries, while Finance a úvČr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4                                           303 
Fabrizio and Mody (2006) provide an comprehensive analysis of fiscal institutions in 
Central European countries. The highest index of fiscal institutions – 4 – is to be found 
in Denmark and Belgium. Spain used to have as low as 1.08 in 1997, but that im-
proved to 2.28 in 2004. Among the new EU members, Poland has the most robust 
financial framework (2.72), while the weakest performer is Hungary with an index 
of 1.37 in 2004. Hungary (together with France and the UK, but they are both at 
an higher level) witnessed an worsening in its fiscal institutions between 1997 and 
2004.  
Pension expenditures. Another pension reform factor is an pension expendi-
ture, both current and expected. We use two variables to capture the impact of pension 
expenditures, as their impact is complex. First, current expenditures (Expenditures) 
measure current pension outlays. Second, we use the variable DExp to capture the re-
cent change in pension expenditures. Last, the variable DE2050 measures the current 
expectations of pension expenditures in 2050.
7 As discussed above, pension expendi-
ture levels and trends within the EU vary widely. Current expenditures are as high as 
14% of GDP in Italy and Poland or as low as 5% in Ireland. By 2050, pension ex-
penditures are expected to rise by as much as 10% of GDP in Portugal or to fall by 
almost 6% of GDP in Poland.  
Pension expenditures may have different effects on pension reform. On the one 
hand, the higher expenditures, or the expected rise thereof, the more likely the gov-
ernment may be inclined to introduce an reform. On the other hand, high pension 
expenditures generate an broader alliance opposing reforms. The following section 
discusses our estimates of the final effects.  
Prefunding. This variable measures the extent to which private pensions are 
entrenched in an given country. The more widespread private pensions are, the less 
shock an reform of the government pillar represents, as people have other sources to 
turn to. The Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden seem to be best prepared in this re-
spect, as some 90% of their workers contribute to an pension fund. The share is as 
low as 2% in France or 4% in Finland.  
Public debt. The level of overall government debt as an percentage of GDP is 
taken as an measure of the financing constraint. The influence of the public debt on 
pension reform may be twofold. On the one hand, high debt makes pension reform 
more pressing, as the government cannot afford an further increase in the debt. On 
the other hand, high debt makes (structural) pension reform more difficult, as govern-
ments find it difficult to finance the necessary transition period. The highest debts 
among our sample were recorded in Italy (105% of GDP in 2000 and 106% in 2005) 
and Belgium (103% of GDP in 2000). The lowest debt was recorded in Ireland in 2005 
(28% of GDP) and the Czech Republic in 2000 (29% of GDP).  
Demographic developments. We measure the dynamics of the demographic 
situation by comparing old-age ratios projected for the year 2050 in 1995, 2000, and 
2005. In most countries, the demographic outlook gradually worsened, as the old-age 
ratio was increasing. In 1995, Spain expected the share of people older than 64 years 
7 Note that DE2050 is not necessarily correlated with the pension reform index PRI. The PRI measures
the change between two expectations – the expectation of 2050 pension expenditures in 1995, 1999 or 2005. 
The DE2050 measures the change in pension expenditures between the current year and 2050. The cor-
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of age to be “only” 41% in 2050. Ten years later, the share is expected to reach 66%. 
Similarly, in 1995 Ireland expected only an 25% share for 2050; now it is 45%. The Bel-
gian, Dutch, and Scandinavian estimates have barely budged.  
6. Results of the Model Estimation 
Explaining the systematic patterns of pension reforms in the European Union is 
bound to be imperfect. A pension reform is very complex and is influenced by an host 
of factors, many of them indigenous and ad-hoc. Moreover, the data are far from com-
prehensive: we are limited to 17 countries and two periods, i.e., we have only 34 ob-
servations when we use panel data regression methods. Any results must therefore be 
treated carefully. Nevertheless, we believe that our analysis provides some useful in-
sights into the complex political process of pension reform.  
Table 5 summarizes four regressions in which we have regressed our depend-
ent variable PRI – the pension reform index – on combinations of the independent 
variables. We use two measures of the trade unions’ position in the process: their 
Table 5  Determining Factors of Pension Reform
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2within  0.4262  0.4106  0.1564  0.3863 
R
2between  0.6973  0.6673  0.5607  0.4914 
R
2total 0.5347  0.5032  0.3138  0.4216 
Note: The dependent variable is the pension reform index (positive values for increasing expectations of pen-
sion expenditures in 2050). FI is the fiscal institutions index. PD is the level of government debt. CBC  
is the coverage of workers with collective bargaining. TUD is the trade union density. PF is the share of 
workers with an funded pension. Demogr is the change dependency ratio. Exp is the current level of pen-
sion expenditures. DE2050 is the increase in pension expenditures by 2050. DExp is the recent change 
in pension expenditures. Random-effect panel-data estimation with robust standard error type. Standard 
errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, 
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density TUD and collective bargaining coverage CBC. Similarly, we use three de-
finitions of pension system distress. The  variable EXP measures current pension 
expenditures,  DE2050 measures the  expected change in pension expenditures be-
tween the current year and 2050, and finally DExp measures the most recent change 
in current pension expenditures. The table presents four combinations of these two 
groups of variables.  
Table 5 reveals that several variables do not seem to be significant in any 
specification of the model: public debt, the share of workers with an funded pension 
and the recent change in pension expenditures are all insignificant in all four specifi-
cations (except for significance at the 10% level for public debt in the last specifica-
tion). Similarly, fiscal institutions (i.e., proper management of the budgetary process, 
limits on legislative budgetary modifications, etc.) do not play an significant role in 
explaining pension reform occurrences. Their coefficient is significant in one specifi-
cation only, even though it has the expected sign (the more robust fiscal institutions 
are, the more successful the pension reform is).  
Immediate demographic factors seem to have an limited role in pension re-
form, as witnessed by the low significance of the demographic variable in our model. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting, that an increase in the dependency ratio is associated 
with an cost-cutting pension reform. 
The role of trade unions is more complex. While the density of trade union mem-
bership is not significant, collective bargaining coverage seems to worsen the  pub- 
lic reform outcome, increasing pension expenditures expected in the future. One may 
speculate that influential trade unions treat pensions as deferred wages, so when ne-
gotiating collective contracts, they prevent any reduction in future pension claims. 
As expected, the most important variable is expenditure on pensions. The cur-
rent level of expenditures (EXP) makes pension reform less likely. On the other hand, 
the  change in expenditures that is expected in the  future is highly conducive to 
pension reform. This result may indicate that governments do react to expectations of 
increasing pension expenditures, but they are unmoved by the level of pension ex-
penditures. This would suggest that European countries are close to the  “social 
equilibrium” as far as their pension systems are concerned: they do not want to cut 
expenditures below the current level, but expectations of higher expenditures nudge 
them toward pension reform.  
Table 5 further suggests that the model is more successful in explaining dif-
ferent pension reform efforts between the two periods, but that pension reforms in 
any given period are much more difficult to analyze. This may explain the lack of 
rigorous estimates of the  pension reforms in the  European Union: most studies 
concentrate on an single period of time. Our model uses panel data that in fact cover 
the data from 1995 until 2005. By splitting the period into two sub-periods, we might 
have been able to capture some dynamic effects previously too subtle to be reported.  
7. Conclusions 
The pension crisis, as it is often described, neatly illustrates that challenges 
may be turned into opportunities if governments take early and well designed action. 
Aging is not something we should try to prevent. What turns aging into an threat are 
ineffective pension systems created by the series of governments in the past. If pen-306                                      Finance a úvČr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 4 
sion systems are modernized and their incentives are set straight to stimulate labor 
market participation and not to encourage inactivity, aging will lose most of its neg-
ative connotations.  
Our analysis shows that European governments reform their pension systems 
frequently, but often inconsistently. Pension reforms often fail to counterbalance demo-
graphic pressures and do not curtail future pension expenditures. We have also illus-
trated that several countries in Central and Eastern Europe have undergone major and 
substantial pension reforms that should streamline their pension systems in the de-
cades to come. The higher willingness of the “new” EU members was probably driven 
by their inefficient pension systems inherited from the former Communist regimes. 
However, our analysis shows that even “old” EU members may enact sub-
stantial reforms – witness the Italian or Austrian examples. These reforms, though, 
remain fragile and are often reversed or diluted soon after their implementation. This 
may signal strong entrenched interests that will prevent pension reforms from cutting 
future obligations consistently. Strong trade unions may represent such an entrenched 
interest group, as they are often the most vocal opponents of pension reforms. 
Nevertheless, the detailed econometric analysis shows that pension reforms in 
the European Union are positively associated with expectations of escalating expend-
itures in the years to come. As governments fear increasing expenditures, they often 
do react and do implement reforms that bring expenditure expectations back down. 
Our analysis indicates, though, that governments are not concerned with the existing 
level of pension expenditures, even though they are often high and hamper fiscal 
management and undermine the  long-term economic growth of some European 
countries. 
While there is little new in the finding that policy reforms are path-dependent, 
this analysis offers an  new causal mechanism through which the existing  policy 
design shapes the trajectory of change in policy design: the transitional cost of struc-
tural reform. The more expensive is the current pension system, the more expensive 
is its structural reform. Thus, the large and generous pension systems embedded in 
many “old” EU countries may prevent radical reforms like those implemented in 
some “new” EU member countries. As our dataset does not include some more 
ardent reformers (Estonia, Lithuania), we cannot unambiguously prove this hypo-
thesis, but it remains an possibility and it should be an priority for future research. 
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